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A Dead Man's Tale: Regulating the Right




In keeping with his mythic life,1 William E. Kane died with an
extraordinary flourish, a profoundly romantic-and arguably egotisti-
* J.D. Candidate, 1995; B.A. University of California, Los Angeles, 1984. I would
like to dedicate this Note to my husband, Thomas-first and ever in my heart.
1. Who was William Everett Kane? That he was wealthy is not disputed, but sources
differ on other details of his life. See, eg., Sharon Churcher, The Love Legacy of Kane:
Mistress of the Man Who Claimed He Inspired Jeffrey Archer's Hit Novel "Kane and Abel"
Battles to Have His Child-Two Years After His Death, MAIL ON SUNDAY (London), Sept.
19, 1993, at 25, available in LEXIS, Nexis, News Library, CURNWS File (portraying Kane
as a "millionaire businessman," "London merchant banker," and "international finan-
cier"); Lover Sues for Dead Man's Sperm, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 4, 1993, at B5 (citing
lawyers who characterize Kane as a "brilliant but eccentric real estate entrepreneur");
Lauren Blau, Sperm Case Argued on Appea" Tug of War Over Custody of Deceased's
Sperm Rages, L.A. DAILY J., June 4, 1993, at 2 (describing Kane as a "Malibu resident who
was qualified to practice law but worked mostly as a financial consultant and strategist for
corporations").
Kane's former wife, Sandra McMahan Irwin, an attorney, met him at Princeton Uni-
versity.- Churcher, supra. Kane graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Princeton, attended Co-
lumbia University as a Fulbright scholar, and was an honors student at Yale Law School.
Jeff Kramer, Progeny or Property?: Frozen Sperm Held in Limbo During Fight over Will,
L.A. TMss, Sept. 27, 1992, at B1, B3. Irwin remembered Kane as a dashing figure who cut
"dazzling" business deals worth millions. Churcher, supra. She recalled frequent social
occasions when they lived in London at which Kane and his friend, novelist Jeffrey Archer,
would awe the other guests-including, at one such event, Margaret Thatcher-with lively
discussions of politics and business transactions. Id. Kane himself claimed that he was the
model for Jeffrey Archer's character "Kane" in his novel Kane and Abel, the story of a
ruthless, rich American businessman. Id.
But there may have been a dark side to Kane. He professed to leading a "double
life," serving the United States as an undercover intelligence agent in diplomatic and mili-
tary strategy. Id. He spoke of his experiences in Laos during the Vietnam War, authored a
book about civil conflict in South America, and claimed to have participated in the war
against Iraq via a secured telephone line from his home. Kramer, supra. Apparently in
connection with his alleged espionage activities, Kane left instructions in his will ordering
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cal-gesture that would rally men's rights activists2 and ultimately es-
tablish legal precedent in America:3 he bequeathed fifteen vials of his
sperm, cryogenically preserved in a sperm bank, to his longtime com-
panion, Deborah Ellen Hecht, for the purpose of conceiving his child
after his death.4 Shortly before committing suicide, Kane wrote a let-
ter to Hecht, expressing his love for her and his hope that she would
choose to bear their child.5 He had even considered what name the
child should have, directing that if it were a girl she should be named
Wyatt Ellen Kane and, if a boy, Joshua Everett Kane.6 Kane also left
a letter for his children-not only for his two adult children from his
former marriage, but also for his "posthumous offspring."' 7 Address-
ing his potential future child or children, he declared, "I have loved
you in my dreams, even though I never got to see you born. ' 8 Kane
the destruction of any personal papers that could compromise the security of the United
States. Last Will and Testament, dated Sept. 27, 1991, at 4 (copy on file with author).
However, Kane's reputation as a "teller of extraordinary tales," a man "brilliant but delib-
erately enigmatic," casts doubt as to whether he actually led a life of international intrigue.
Pam Lambert & Stanley Young, Frozen Assets: A Millionaire's Suicide Leaves His Lover
and His Family Battling over His Estate-and His Sperm, PEOPLE, Feb. 22, 1993, at 75.
"Told that he maintained a hot line to the White House, was friendly with Oliver North
and had helped George Bush design a new world order, Kane's friends and co-workers
never knew where James Bond left off and Walter Mitty began." David Margolick, Battle
Royal at the Sperm Bank, S.F. CHRON., May 15, 1994, (This World), at 6. Irwin said that
Kane spent a "lifetime spinning tall stories... [and at his death] he could no longer tell the
difference between fact and fiction." Churcher, supra.
Perhaps most revealing of Kane's persona is a letter that he wrote shortly before his
suicide, in which he called his life "an object of self-sculpture-a personal creation [of]
which I am still proud. In truth, death for me is not the opposite of life; it is a form of life's
punctuation." Hecht v. Superior Court (Kane), 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 277 (Ct. App. 1993),
review denied, 1993 Cal. LEXIS 4768 (Cal. Sept. 2, 1993) (en banc).
2. See infra notes 23, 25-26 and accompanying text.
3. See infra note 22.
4. In October 1991, in preparation for taking his own life, Kane deposited 15 vials of
his sperm at California Cryobank, Inc., a sperm bank located in Los Angeles, California.
The account was governed by a "Specimen Storage Agreement," signed by Kane on Sep-
tember 24, 1991, in which he authorized the sperm bank to release the sperm to Hecht or
to Hecht's physician, and which furthermore directed the sperm bank, in the event of his
death, either to continue storing the sperm at the discretion of the executor of his estate or
to release the sperm to the executor. In his will dated September 27, 1991, three days after
he entered into the agreement with the sperm bank, Kane appointed Hecht as the executor
of his estate and specifically bequeathed all of the frozen sperm to her. In a provision of
his will called "Statement of Wishes," Kane indicated that the sperm should be used by
Hecht for impregnation, "should she so desire," and expressed his wish that certain per-
sonal effects be preserved for their future child or children. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276-
77.
5. See Lambert & Young, supra note 1, at 76.
6. See Kramer, supra note 1.
7. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277.
8. Id.
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took his own life at the age of 48 on October 30, 1991, at a hotel in Las
Vegas, Nevada.9
Kane's unusual bequest spawned a fierce legal battle over the
ownership of the sperm between Hecht and Kane's children, William
Everett Kane, Jr., and Katharine Elizabeth Kane, represented by their
mother and Kane's former wife, attorney Sandra McMahan Irwin.'0
Calling their father's desire for a posthumous baby "egotistic and irre-
sponsible," the children urged the probate court to order the destruc-
tion of the sperm to prevent the birth of a fatherless child, the
disruption of their existing family, and "additional emotional, psycho-
logical and financial stress."" Moreover, they stated, they did "not
wish to be troubled for the rest of their lives with worries about the
fate of their half-sibling(s)."' 2 Hecht countered by arguing that the
sperm rightfully belonged to her, either by virtue of Kane's having
designated her to receive the sperm in his agreement with the sperm
bank or through the specific bequest in his will, and that destruction of
the sperm "would violate her rights to privacy and procreation under
the federal and California Constitutions.' 3
I When the probate court found the children's arguments more
persuasive and accordingly ordered the destruction of the sperm, 14
9. Id. at 276. Kane killed himself in the penthouse suite of the Mirage Hotel in Las
Vegas. Margolick, supra note 1. He left a handwritten note "informing the hotel's manag-
ers that his decision had nothing to do with the quality of their service." Id at 7. Given
that Kane was "a man who spent a lifetime embellishing his biography and playing mind
games with those he loved," id, it seems fitting that he chose to die in a place called the
"Mirage."
10. Kane's family and friends believe that he "would have thoroughly enjoyed the
spectacle he... unleashed. Bill Kane, they say, laughed all the way to the sperm bank."
Margolick, supra note 1, at 7.
Kane's estate is estimated to have had a value of one million dollars at the time of his
death. Maura Dolan, High Court Lets Stand Ruling Allowing Man to Will Sperm, L.A.
TMms, Sept. 3, 1993, at B3. In December 1991, Kane's children each filed separate will
contests challenging the disposition of the estate, the bulk of which was left to Hecht.
Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277. After the parties entered into a settlement agreement, a
dispute arose as to whether the sperm was included in the estate and therefore subject to
the settlement agreement (whereby Hecht would receive 20% of the sperm) or whether
Kane had gifted the sperm to Hecht prior to his death pursuant to the terms of his agree-
ment with the sperm bank. Id at 277-79. The administrator of Kane's estate filed a peti-
tion with the probate court requesting instructions for the disposition of the sperm and a
determination as to whether any child conceived from the sperm would be entitled to share
in Kane's estate. Id. at 278. Four possible resolutions of the dispute were suggested to the
court, including destruction of the sperm. Id at 279.
11. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 279.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. When asked for the legal foundation for its ruling, the court answered, "It really
does not matter, does it? If I am right, I am right and if I am wrong, I am wrong." In
addition, the court commented that "we are all agreed that we are forging new frontiers
March 1995]
Hecht appealed. The California Court of Appeal determined that the
probate court had abused its discretion, 15 holding:
[A]t the time of his death, [Kane] had an interest, in the nature of
ownership, to the extent that he had decision-making authority as to
the use of his sperm for reproduction. Such interest is sufficient to
constitute "property" within the meaning of Probate Code section
62.16 Accordingly, the probate court had jurisdiction with respect to
the vials of sperm.' 7
Furthermore, the appellate court declared that it was "aware of no
statutes in California which contain a 'statement of public policy
which reveals an interest that could justify infringing on gamete-prov-
iders' decisional authority.""'18 Kane's children petitioned the Califor-
nia Supreme Court for review of the appellate court's decision, but to
no avail-the high court denied review, allowing the appellate court's
ruling to stand.19
Although the California judiciary determined that a man has the
right to bequeath his sperm, the ruling did not resolve the issue of the
ownership of the sperm in Hecht, and the case was remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings. 20 In March 1994, the trial court
ruled that the sperm would be divided pursuant to the parties' settle-
ment agreement, thus awarding Hecht three of the fifteen vials.
because science has run ahead of the common law. And we have got to have some sort of
appellate decision telling us what rights are in these uncharted territories." lId at n.3.
15. Id. at 291.
16. "'Property' means anything that may be the subject of ownership and includes
both real and personal property and any interest therein." CAL. PROB. CODE § 62 (West
1991).
17. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 283. Although an in-depth critique of the appellate
court's decision is beyond the scope of this Note, it bears mentioning that the court distin-
guished the facts in Hecht from the facts in Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479
(Cal. 1990). Id. at 280-81. The court noted that in Moore the California Supreme Court
recognized that the legislature enacted specialized laws to govern the disposition of human
tissue in light of specific policy goals; thus, general property law did not apply to such
tissue, and the plaintiff failed to state a claim under general property law for the conversion
of his excised cells. Id Pointing to the critical difference between the two cases, the appel-
late court noted that Moore did not expect to continue to possess his tissue once it had
been removed from his body, whereas, in the instant case, Kane both intended and ex-
pected to continue to control his sperm even after it had been deposited with the sperm
bank, as evidenced by his agreement with the sperm bank. Id at n.4.
18. Id. at 289 (citing Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992)). Davis in-
volved a dispute over the disposition of frozen embryos following the divorce of the em-
bryos' progenitors. In reaching its decision, the Hecht court relied substantially on the
analysis in Davis.
For a discussion of the public policy arguments advanced by Kane's children, see Al-
bert Momjian, "Life's Punctuation" May Be a Question Mark, PA. L. WKLY., July 11, 1994,
at 6.
19. Hecht v. Superior Court (Kane), 1993 Cal. LEXIS 4768 (Cal. Sept. 2, 1993) (en
banc).
20. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 291.
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Kane's children promptly appealed.21 As of this writing, it remains to
be seen whether Hecht will ultimately obtain any of Kane's sperm.
Regardless of the outcome with respect to Kane's sperm, the
Hecht case set a precedent2 in America that received a warm wel-
21. Carla Hall, A Legacy of Litigation, L.A. TnAEs, Nov. 10, 1994, at E9.
22. Henry Weinstein, Judges Rule Man Can Bequeath Sperm in Will, L.A. Trms, June
19, 1993, at B1. Marvin L. Rudnick, Hecht's attorney, said of the Hecht decision: "This is
the first time in history that an American court has ruled that sperm is property, that it can
be willed and that a deceased person can father a child." Id at B8.
Although the Hecht decision establishes legal precedent in the United States, it does
not mark the first time that a woman has sought the sperm of her deceased mate. In 1977
Kim Casali, the "Love Is" cartoonist, gave birth to a boy, her third son by her husband,
Roberto, who had died 16 months earlier of cancer. Lori B. Andrews, Brave New Baby,
STuDENr LAW., Dec. 1983, at 25, 28; Paternity: Life After Death, ECONOMIST (Britain),
July 16, 1977, at 23. Roberto had stored specimens of his sperm before he began chemo-
therapy treatment for cancer. See Andrews, supra. I am not aware that Casali experienced
any difficulty in obtaining her husband's sperm after his death or that anyone opposed her
pregnancy (other than that the Vatican castigated her after the novel circumstances of her
son's birth became known). See Paternity: Life After Death, supra.
More controversial was Parpalaix v. CECOS, a 1984 French case cited by the Hecht
court. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 287-88 (citing Judgment of Aug. 1, 1984 (Parpalaix v.
CECOS), Trib. gr. inst., Gazette du Palais [G.P.], Sept. 15, 1984, at 11). Like Casali's hus-
band, Corinne Parpalaix's husband, Alain, suffered from cancer; he deposited one speci-
men of sperm prior to commencing chemotherapy. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene
Sonnenbick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-Mortem Insemination, 1 J.L. &
Health 229, 229 (1986-87). Alain did not leave any instructions with the sperm bank as to
the disposition of his sperm in the event of his death. Id at 229-30. After his death, the
sperm bank refused to release Alain's sperm to Corinne, just "as other centers had denied
the requests of other widows." Id at 230 (footnote omitted). Corinne and Alain's parents
sued, basing their legal claim to the sperm on their status as Alain's "natural heirs" and
also arguing passionately that Corinne had a "moral right" to "give life to this child, the
fruit of a love that she goes on expressing with quiet determination.... her most sacred
right." Id. at 230-31 (footnote omitted). The sperm bank resisted on the grounds that its
duty was to the depositor, not to the depositor's next-of-kin; moreover, it viewed the sperm
deposit as uninheritable in the same manner that a limb or other portion of the body is
uninheritable, in the absence of the depositor's clear wishes to the contrary; and, finally, it
raised the specter of "all sorts of abuses" should the sperm be released to others, including
the possibility of lesbian couples bearing children through the use of donor sperm. Id. at
231. The French court, while acknowledging that the laws of inheritance and paternity
would in effect bar a posthumously conceived child from inheriting through the father,
ruled in favor of Corinne. Id at 231-33. The court found that a human being has a funda-
mental right "to conceive or not to conceive," and thus the only question was whether
Alain intended to conceive. Id. at 232 (footnote omitted). Because Corinne and Alain's
parents were in the best position to know Alain's intent, their testimony about his desire
for a child was persuasive. Id. at 232. Subsequently, Corinne was artificially inseminated
with Alain's sperm, but she did not become pregnant. Id. at 233.
More recent cases have been called a "veritable mini-baby boom among the dead."
Maggie Gallagher, About Sperm: The Ultimate Deadbeat Dads, NE-WSDAY, Feb. 1, 1995,
(Viewpoints), at A28. In December 1994, Anthony Baez died-perhaps by murder-while
in police custody. At the behest of his widow, a physician removed sperm from the dead
man's body so that the decedent "could, in the future, become a father." Id. A week later,
a woman who had heard about the Baez case made the same request after her husband was
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come from both men's rights groups23 and several bioethics scholars.24
During the course of the litigation, men's movement activists de-
manded that Kane's last wishes be fulfilled.25 They joined Hecht in
arguing that a man has the right to do what he pleases with his body-
and his sperm.26 Another segment of society agreed. When the deci-
sion was announced, it was hailed by bioethics experts as "another
significant step in the law of bioethics as courts move into unchartered
territory where science has outpaced the law." 27 Hecht is regarded as
consistent with the general trend in the law of new reproductive tech-
nology of permitting gamete-providers to decide the fate of their re-
productive cells. 28
Other responses to Hecht focused on the social ramifications of a
man's29 right to bequeath sperm, ranging from dire warnings of "a
killed in an accident. Jeff Stryker, Conceiving Justice: From Which Dead Men and For
Which Survivors Should Sperm Be Harvested?, RECORDER (San Francisco), Mar. 31, 1995,
(Commentary), at 6. Meanwhile, 14 inmates on San Quentin's death row have sued for the
right to preserve their sperm "for insemination with willing women," and a Louisiana wo-
man has begun a landmark suit seeking Social Security benefits for her daughter who,
having been conceived after the father's death from cancer, is regarded as "fatherless"
under state law and therefore ineligible for survivor's benefits. Ellen Goodman, The Law
vs. New Fact of Life, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 26, 1995, (Op-Ed), at 13.
23. Churcher, supra note 1 (calling Hecht the "heroine of the new and growing men's
rights movement" and referring to the case as "the male equivalent of the abortion contro-
versy in America").
24. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
25. See Churcher, supra note 1.
26. Claudia Fitzherbert, Come On Boys, That's Enough, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Sept. 21, 1993, (Notebook), at 19, available in LEXIS, Nexis, News Library,
CURNWS File. Fitzherbert states:
I have long been perplexed by the aims and aspirations of the burgeoning "men's
movement" in America, while wishing it well in a general, woolly sort of way ....
Deborah Hecht has become an icon among leading activists in the men's move-
ment. Her argument-and theirs-is that men have the right to do exactly what
they like with their own bodies and sperm. Perhaps the sex war in America is
drawing to some sort of surreal close. The frontliners on either side are fighting,
it seems, for the same thing: the right to bring fatherless children into the world.
Id.
27. Weinstein, supra note 22, at B8.
28. Id.
29. Although the Hecht decision specifically addressed a man's property interest in his
sperm, it seems reasonable to assume that, should the question ever arise, a court would
find that a woman has a like interest in her ova. Currently, it is almost impossible to
successfully preserve human ova cryogenically. See Kathleen Doheny, A Priceless Possibil-
ity, L.A. TiMEs, Mar. 19, 1995, at E6. The ova often suffer damage after freezing and fail to
develop into a normal embryo. Christine A. Djalleta, A Twinkle in a Decedent's Eye: Pro-
posed Amendments to the Uniform Probate Code in Light of New Reproductive Technol-
ogy, 67 TEMP. L. REv., 335, 337 (1994).
Obviously, if a man wished to procreate by the cryogenically preserved egg of a de-
ceased woman, he would face the burden of engaging the services of a surrogate mother. It
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generation of sperm bank orphans"30 to the prospect of "pursuing im-
mortality by saving gametes for anyone to use, even eons after one's
own death."' 31 While such hypotheses are intriguing, this Note does
not attempt to investigate the possible impact of posthumous concep-
tion on reproductive practices, the risks and benefits of parenthood
after death, the emotional burdens that posthumous conception may
impose on a child, or similar social issues.32
Instead, this Note assumes that some men will want to exercise
this unique property right33 and therefore attempts to introduce the
precept of paternal responsibility into the new procreative context es-
tablished by Hecht. If, as the court stated in Hecht, frozen sperm is to
be regarded as "'an interim category [between person and property]
that entitles [it] to special respect because of [its] potential for human
life,"'' it is reasonable for the state to attach special responsibilities
and consequences to a bequest or contractual conveyance of such
was recently reported that "[iln Italy, a baby was born... with the egg of her dead mother,
the sperm of her father and the womb of her father's sister." Goodman, supra note 22.
30. Churcher, supra note 1.
31. Michael H. Shapiro, What Rights Might Be Held by the "Fertile Decedents"?, L.A.
DAILY J., Mar. 9, 1993, at 7.
32. For a discussion of such issues, see id.; Gallagher, supra note 22 (questioning
whether society has "an obligation to stretch its institutions-from probate law to Social
Security to medical insurance-to facilitate ... the desire to procreate with the dead");
Goodman, supra note 22 (considering on the one hand whether society "should discourage
the idea of building a future from the grave," but on the other hand recognizing that a
posthumously conceived child can be a gift); Stryker, supra note 22 (urging that, now that
"alternative insemination" includes the "macabre variation of harvesting sperm from the
newly dead," it is time for societal debate and public regulation). For a discussion of the
public policy arguments advanced by Kane's children, see Momjian, supra note 18.
33. The cryogenic preservation of sperm may be a reassuring safeguard for men
whose work or health poses risk to their reproductive systems. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra
note 31 (suggesting that freezing one's gametes may be attractive for persons engaged in
hazardous occupations, such as soldiers); Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 22, at 235
(describing how the option of storing sperm was offered to astronauts in 1961 so that they
could still father children in the event that space travel damaged their reproductive abili-
ties); Paternity: Life After Death, supra note 22 and Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 22,
at 229, 235 (relating how two terminally ill men, Roberto Casali and Alain Parpalaix, cry-
ogenically preserved their sperm in the hope that their wives would bear their children
after their deaths).
But the storing of sperm may have an adverse impact on some women. While having
a loved one's sperm available for procreation may help to relieve a family's grief over a
man's untimely death, one can easily envision the enormous pressure that may be brought
to bear on his widow or longtime girlfriend to undergo artificial insemination,,pregnancy,
childbirth, and the burdens of parenthood for the sake of carrying on the deceased male's
"family line"-a choice that may not be in the woman's best interests.
34. Hecht v. Superior Court (Kane), 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275,281 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992)). In Davis the court decided that em-
bryos were not "persons" under Tennessee law, but neither were they "property"; instead,
they fell into an "interim" category. Id. at 283 (citing Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 597).
March 1995]
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property to protect the welfare and rights of the human life that may
result. Since existing law governing parental obligations of support
and a child's inheritance rights currently extends its greatest protec-
tion to the child conceived by coitus when the parents' intent to pro-
create is signified by marriage, 35 the posthumously conceived child,
also the product of an intent to procreate, should fall within this pro-
tection. However, in drafting new legislation for these special circum-
stances, a balance must be struck between ensuring that the
posthumously conceived child is accorded the same rights as children
conceived by coitus in a committed relationship and the need for effi-
ciency in settling the affairs of a deceased.
This Note shows how existing California law excludes the posthu-
mously conceived child and proposes guidelines for new legislation
governing these special circumstances. Part I of this Note examines
how children born after their fathers' deaths are affected differently
by laws governing support and inheritance depending upon whether
they were conceived posthumously or by coitus. To alleviate the dis-
advantages suffered by the posthumously conceived child, Part II of-
fers a justification grounded in theories of intent-based parenthood
for restricting a man's power over the testamentary disposition of his
property and circumscribing the rights of his heirs under inheritance
law when he chooses to bequeath or contractually convey his sperm
for procreation after his death. Part III reviews other states' legisla-
tion affecting the paternity or inheritance rights of the posthumously
conceived child and concludes that these laws continue to adhere to
rules based on an outdated notion of reproduction. Finally, Part IV
proposes guidelines for new legislation, attempting to provide for the
posthumously conceived child without impacting the established legis-
lative scheme of property devolution beyond tolerable limits.
IL The Treatment of the Posthumous Child Under Existing
California Law
Until relatively recently in the history of humanity, reproduction
could occur by only one means: coitus. Legends and stories about
conception by other means notwithstanding, 36 this basic rule of human
biology served as a solid foundation in the development of the law. It
required that a man engage in sexual intercourse during his lifetime in
order to become a father. Once a man died, his opportunity to be-
come a parent died with him. Thus, the date of a man's death natu-
35. See generally infra Part I.
36. See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 22, at 229 n.3 (noting that ancient Jewish
law recognized that it was possible for a woman to conceive "while bathing in water into
which a man had discharged semen," or by lying on sheets upon which a man had left
semen).
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rally became a cutoff date: jurists never imagined that a person could
be conceived after that date, much less that such a person might de-
mand a child's rights against a man's estate.
Subpart A of Part I explains the importance of paternity as the
basis for a child's access to the benefits that accrue from the father-
child relationship and illustrates the obstacles encountered by the
posthumously conceived child in establishing paternity. Subpart B de-
scribes the various sources of child support available from a man's
estate and discusses how the posthumously conceived child is pre-
cluded from access to these sources. Subpart C addresses the
problems faced by the posthumously conceived child in attempting to
claim a share of the father's estate, either as an intestate heir or under
the father's will. The development of modem methods of reproduc-
tion has fast outpaced the law, leaving a wide gap. Until the law
catches up, the posthumously conceived child will be denied benefits
to which she should be entitled.
A. The Importance of Establishing Paternity
The California Legislature recognizes the importance of estab-
lishing paternity for every child. In its statement of purpose for a pro-
gram designed to establish a conclusive presumption of paternity
through a voluntary declaration signed by the father at the time of a
child's birth, the legislature declared:
(a) There is a compelling state interest in establishing paternity for
all children. Establishing paternity is the first step toward a
child support award, which, in turn, provides children with
equal rights and access to benefits, including, but not limited to,
social security, health insurance, survivors' benefits, military
benefits, and inheritance rights. Knowledge of family medical
history is often necessary for correct medical diagnosis and
treatment. Additionally, knowing one's father is important to a
child's development.
(b) A simple system allowing for establishment of voluntary pater-
nity will result in a significant increase in the ease of establish-
ing paternity, a significant increase in paternity establishment,
an increase in the number of children who have greater access
to child support and other benefits, and a significant decrease in
the time and money required to establish paternity due to the
removal of the need for a lengthy and expensive court process
to determine and establish paternity and is in the public
interest.37
Proof of paternity is essential before a child can access the rights
and benefits that flow from the father-child relationship. As the law
now stands, the methods for proving paternity for a child born after
37. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7570 (West 1994).
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the father's death are most favorable for the child conceived by coitus
by a couple who were married or attempted to marry; harshly restric-
tive for the child conceived by coitus and whose parents made no ef-
fort to marry; and unattainable for the posthumously conceived child.
The child conceived by coitus and born after her father's death to
parents whose commitment to one another was evidenced by marriage
or an attempt to marry is accorded a statutory presumption of pater-
nity. Under these circumstances, if the child is born within 300 days
(the standard nine months of human gestation plus allowance for late
delivery) after the man's death, the man is presumed to be the child's
natural father, 38 and the child enjoys all the benefits and rights stem-
ming from the father-child relationship.
In contrast, the child conceived by coitus and born after her fa-
ther's death to parents who were not married and made no attempt to
marry must file an action to establish paternity pursuant to Family
Code section 7630(c), which is available to a child who has no pre-
sumed father.39 But, even if successful, a paternity action under sec-
tion 7630(c) secures limited economic benefits to the child. For
example, it will not result in the establishment of the father-child rela-
tionship for purposes of intestate succession unless the court order is
38. Family Code sections 7540 and 7611 provide in pertinent part:
7540. [T]he child of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent
or sterile, is conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage.
7611. A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if he meets the
conditions provided in Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 7540) of Part 2 or in
any of the following subdivisions: (a) He and the child's natural mother are or
have been married to each other and the child is born during the marriage, or
within 300 days after the marriage is terminated by death, annulment, declaration
of invalidity, or divorce, or after a judgment of separation is entered by a court.
(b) Before the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have attempted to
marry each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compliance with law,
although the attempted marriage is or could be declared invalid, and either of the
following is true: (1) If the attempted marriage could be declared invalid only by
a court, the child is born during the attempted marriage, or within 300 days after
its termination by death, annulment, declaration of invalidity, or divorce; (2) If
the attempted marriage is invalid without a court order, the child is born within
300 days after the termination of the cohabitation.
CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7540, 7611(a)-(b) (West 1994).
While it is technically possible for a woman to whom a man has bequeathed or con-
tractually conveyed his sperm to have herself artificially inseminated immediately after his
death and bear a child within the 300-day period, it seems unlikely that she would meet the
deadline, given that she may be uninformed about the importance of the timing, preoccu-
pied with grief and the affairs of her deceased mate, or simply unable to conceive immedi-
ately. On the other hand, if a woman were to become pregnant shortly after the man's
death, this rigid deadline may encourage some women to induce early labor so as to give
birth within the 300-day period and secure for her child the economic benefits that flow
from paternity.
39. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(c) (West 1994).
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entered during the father's lifetime.40 When the child is born after the
father's death, this requirement demands that a paternity action be
filed and resolved within the gestation period and before the father's
death,4 1 an unlikely occurrence given the sluggishness of the court sys-
tem. However, even if a successful Family Code section 7630(c) ac-
tion fails to procure a child's inheritance rights because the order was
entered after the father's death, it will nonetheless permit the child to
petition to receive a family allowance during the administration of the
decedent's estate.42 Unfortunately, by the time the child has been
born and paternity established, the estate may no longer be open.
These rigid timing requirements make securing benefits for the child
conceived by coitus and born after the father's death much more diffi-
cult when the parents never attempted to marry. The legislature justi-
fies these restrictions on the grounds that problems of proof arise after
a father passes away and dubious paternity claims may interfere with
the orderly distribution of a decedent's estate.43
The posthumously conceived child is precluded from proving that
her father was the man who bequeathed or contractually conveyed his
sperm to the child's mother. Paragraph (b) of Family Code section
7631 flatly denies a means of establishing paternity under these cir-
cumstances, stating that "[t]he donor of semen provided to a licensed
physician and surgeon for use in artificial insemination of a woman
40. In order for a Family Code § 7630(c) action to establish the father-child relation-
ship for purposes of a child's rights under intestacy law, either a court order determining
paternity must have been entered during the father's lifetime or clear and convincing evi-
dence must show that the father openly held out the child as his own. CAL. PROB. CODE
§ 6453(b)(1)-(2) (West Supp. 1995). Obviously, the latter requirement cannot be met if the
child is born after her father's death.
Former Probate Code § 6408 was recently replaced by §§ 6450-6455. Paragraphs (1)
and (2) of § 6453(b) continue the substance of § 6408(f), with one intriguing exception: the
addition of paragraph (3). Under paragraph (3), the parent-child relationship may be es-
tablished pursuant to a Family Code § 7630(c) action when "[i]t was impossible for the
father to hold out the child as his own and paternity is established by clear and convincing
evidence." Paragraph (3) was not included in the recommended legislative changes pro-
posed by the California Law Revision Commission. 23 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REP.
991, 1005 (1993). Thus, we are left without the benefit of the Commission's guidance as to
the purpose of this addition. It remains to be seen whether the child conceived by coitus
and born after her father's death to parents who neither married nor attempted to marry
may establish paternity under paragraph (3) for purposes of intestate succession.
41. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7633 (West 1994) (permitting a paternity action to be filed
prior to the child's birth).
42. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6540(a)(2) (West 1991). A minor child is entitled to a family
allowance during the administration of a deceased parent's estate regardless of whether the
child is born of a marital relationship or out of wedlock. Estate of Woodward, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 781, 784 (Ct. App. 1964). "[T]he right to a family allowance does not rest upon, or
equate with, the right of inheritance." Id. at 782 (citing Estate of Myers, 1 P.2d 1013, 1015
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931)).
43. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
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other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the
natural father of a child thereby conceived." 44 This statute prevents a
finding of paternity even if the woman was the donor's wife at the
time of the donor's death; since marriage is deemed to have termi-
nated upon the death of either spouse,45 at the time the posthumous
artificial insemination occurred her status would have changed from a
wife to "a woman other than the donor's wife." It should be noted
that this provision was intended to provide men with "a statutory ve-
hicle for donating semen . . . without fear of liability for child sup-
port";46 thus, its drafters did not contemplate circumstances such as
those arising in Hecht, in which the sperm donor intended to procreate
and be recognized as the resulting child's father.
It appears that the only way to circumvent the preclusion of do-
nor paternity under Family Code section 7613(b) is by insemination
without the aid of a physician. In Jhordan C. v. Mary K.,47 a man
provided semen to an unmarried woman so that she could inseminate
herself in the privacy of her home. She intended to raise the child
with a close woman friend. After the child was born, the donor was
able to establish that he was the child's father, despite the woman's
protests. The court ruled that because the woman had undertaken to
inseminate herself, rather than seeking the aid of a physician, the stat-
ute (now Family Code section 7613(b)) did not protect her child from
the donor's paternity claims. 48 However, the use of frozen sperm
without the expertise of a physician would render it unlikely that in-
semination would result in conception. Whereas in Jhordan the donor
produced the semen at the woman's home and the woman used it for
insemination immediately thereafter,49 self-insemination would be
much more difficult to achieve when the sperm has been cryogenically
preserved and must be thawed, rehydrated, and cleansed prior to in-
sertion.50 Nonetheless, if self-insemination were successful, the wo-
man could bring an action to establish paternity under Family Code
section 7630(c) 51 and realize the same limited family allowance bene-
fits available to the child conceived by coitus and born after the fa-
ther's death to a couple who made no attempt to marry.52 (For
44. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 1994).
45. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (a)-(b), cited supra note 38 (acknowledging that
marriage is terminated by death).
46. Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 534 (Ct. App. 1986).
47. 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct. App. 1986).
48. Id. at 531.
49. Id. at 532.
50. See Emily McAllister, Defining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Repro-
ductive Technology: Implications for Inheritance, 29 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J., 55, 63
(1994).
51. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(c) (West 1994).
52. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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purposes of the remainder of this Note, it is assumed that self-insemi-
nation of cryogenically preserved sperm is not a viable option.)
Obviously, neither the posthumous child conceived by coitus by a
couple who never attempted to marry nor the posthumously con-
ceived child derive any benefit from statutory presumptions of pater-
nity that flow from a man's conduct after a child's birth.53
The harsh effects that may result under California law for failing
to determine paternity during a man's lifetime when a statutory pre-
sumption is unavailable seem perplexing in light of the advent of
DNA testing.5 4 Despite the legislature's recognition of a compelling
state interest in establishing paternity for every child,55 it has repeat-
edly rejected more permissive means of proof such as DNA testing,
insisting that the current restrictive rules are necessary to provide a
"just and orderly distribution of property at death" and to "discourage
dubious paternity claims made after a father's death for the sole pur-
pose of inheritance. '5 6 One California court, while observing that
"perhaps only the proverbial ostrich with its head in the sand would
dispute the fact remarkable progress has been made in these areas in
recent years,"5 7 nevertheless declined to hold that the limitations
upon the means of proving paternity after a father's death violated the
53. Family Code section 7611 provides that a man is presumed to be the natural father
of a child if:
(c) After the child's birth, he and the child's natural mother have married, or
attempted to marry, each other by a marriage solemnized in apparent compli-
ance with law, although the attempted marriage is or could be declared inva-
lid, and either of the following is true: (1) With his consent, he is named as
the child's father on the child's birth certificate; (2) He is obligated to support
the child under a written voluntary promise or by court order.
(d) He receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his
natural child.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611 (c)-(d) (West 1994). The program providing for the establishment
of paternity by voluntary declaration also requires particular conduct by the father after
the child's birth, specifically, the execution of a declaration. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7570-
7577 (West 1994).
54. As an Ohio court noted:
[T]he bottom line to denying an illegitimate child equal inheritance rights is that
there is a substantial problem of proof of paternity, especially after the alleged
father is dead. Today, however, we are entering a new era. Science has devel-
oped a means to irrefutably prove the identity of an illegitimate child's father. No
longer are we dependent upon fallible testimony, nor are we concerned that the
decedent cannot be present to defend himself. The accuracy and infallibility of
the DNA test are nothing short of remarkable. We live in a modern and scientific
society, and the law must keep pace with these developments.
Alexander v. Alexander, 537 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1988).
55. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
56. Estate of Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 536, 544 (Ct. App. 1992) (footnote omitted).
Since 1983, the legislature has repeatedly reaffirmed its position on this issue. Id.
57. Id.
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constitutional requirement of equal protection. 58 The court cited a
United States Supreme Court decision in which a similar but even
more restrictive New York statute was sustained in the face of an
equal protection challenge.59 In that case, the United States Supreme
Court concluded that the restrictions were substantially related to the
state interest of providing an "orderly disposition of a decedent's
property in cases involving paternity claims, which present difficult
problems of proof when the father is no longer alive."' 60
The California court recommended that arguments for moderniz-
ing the methods of establishing paternity in light of scientific advances
be addressed to the legislature. 61 In view of the legislature's refusal to
reconsider its proof of paternity rules in the past,62 however, such ar-
guments likely would be to no avail. The legislature's preferred ap-
proach to a postmortem paternity claim has been to award a
presumption of paternity to children conceived by coitus by a couple
whose intent to procreate is evidenced by marriage or an attempt to
marry63 and to force children conceived by coitus by a couple who
never attempted to marry to procure limited rights through
litigation.64
As the circumstances of the posthumously conceived child most
closely resemble that of a child born from a committed relationship,
new legislation should be drafted to allow a paternity presumption in
such child's favor and to create an exception from the preclusion of
paternity under Family Code section 7613, which was never meant to
apply in situations exemplified by Hecht.
58. Id. at 544-45.
59. Id. at 545 (citing Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978)).
60. Id. In Lalli the Supreme Court noted:
We do not question that there will be some illegitimate children who would be
able to establish their relationship to their deceased fathers without serious dis-
ruption of the administration of estates and that, as applied to such individuals,
[the New York statute] appears to operate unfairly. But few statutory classifica-
tions are entirely free from the criticism that they sometimes produce inequitable
results. Our inquiry under the Equal Protection Clause does not focus on the
abstract "fairness" of a state law, but on whether the statute's relation to the state
interests it is intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the rationality con-
templated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 545 n.20 (citing Lalli, 439 U.S. at 272-73).
61. Sanders, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 545.
62. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
63. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
64. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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B. Parent's Duty to Support Minor Child
In California, each parent has an equal responsibility to support a
minor child in the manner suitable to the child's circumstances. 65
Generally, this duty continues until the child attains the age of
nineteen, marries, or completes the twelfth grade of high school,
whichever occurs first.66 Parents owe the duty of support to a minor
child irrespective of whether the child was born within a marital rela-
tionship or out of wedlock. 67
California follows the common-law rule that terminates a par-
ent's liability for the support of a minor child upon the parent's
death.68 However, there are four exceptions to this rule: a family al-
lowance is provided for the minor child's support during the adminis-
tration of the deceased parent's estate;69 an obligation of support fixed
by a divorce decree survives the deceased parent's death and is
chargeable against the estate;7 ° a "pauper's provision" permits county
or state authorities to claim assets from the deceased parent's estate if
upon the parent's death the minor child will be dependent upon the
state for support or confined in a state institution at the expense of the
state;71 and a written promise to support a child, growing out of a
65. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3900 (West 1994).
66. Family Code § 3901(a) states: "The duty of support imposed by Section 3900 con-
tinues as to an unmarried child who has attained the age of 18 years, is a full-time high
school student, and who is not self-supporting, until the time the child completes the 12th
grade or attains the age of 19 years, whichever occurs first." CAL. FAM. CODE § 3901(a)
(West 1994).
67. CAL. FAm. CODE § 3900 (West 1994).
68. B.E. WrrnxN, SuMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW Parent & Child § 281(2) (10th ed.
1989).
69. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6540 (West 1991).
70. Newman v. Burwell, 15 P.2d 511 (Cal. 1932). Commentators have noted the
strange result under California law that the child of divorced parents is entitled to contin-
ued support after her parent's death as fixed by the divorce decree, but continued support
is denied to the child of a unified family. Jack Leavitt, Scope and Effectiveness of No
Contest Clauses in Last Wills and Testaments, 15 HASTMNGS L.J. 45, 89 (1963); Kathryn
Gehrels, Liability of Estate of Divorced Father for Support of Minor Child, 22 CAL. L. Rv.
79, 85 (1933-34) (calling this result "ludicrous" in that it makes it more "advantageous to
be a child whose family life has been sufficiently upset as to necessitate court interfer-
ence"). One possible rationale for this rule is that it serves to guard against the risk that a
divorced parent may disinherit a child from a former marriage. Gehrels, supra at 84. Yet,
a child of a unified family who is denied continued support may also be disinherited.
71. Family Code § 3952 states:
If a parent chargeable with the support of a child dies leaving the child chargeable
to the county or leaving the child confined in a state institution to be cared for in
whole or in part at the expense of the state, and the parent leaves an estate suffi-
cient for the child's support, the supervisors of the county or the director of the
state department having jurisdiction over the institution may claim provision for
the child's support from the parent's estate, and for this purpose has the same
remedies as a creditor against the estate of the parent and may obtain reimburse-
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presumed or alleged father-child relationship, will be enforced accord-
ing to its terms.72 As applied to the child born after the father's death,
access to these sources of support varies depending on the child's abil-
ity to establish paternity, the existence of an enforceable obligation of
postmortem support, and available financial resources.
The family allowance is viewed as a temporary extension of a par-
ent's lifetime obligation to support a minor child.73 Sums needed for
living expenses are paid from the decedent's estate to support the
child during the period of the estate's administration. 74 The judge has
the discretion to make the payments retroactive, but not earlier than
the date of death.75 Because a lifetime support obligation includes all
of the parent's children, whether born in or out of wedlock, the family
allowance, as an extension of that all-inclusive obligation, is available
to any child who can establish paternity prior to the close of the es-
tate. The child born after her father's death who enjoys the benefit of
a statutory presumption of paternity because her parents were mar-
ried or had attempted to marry is eligible to petition for a family al-
lowance immediately upon birth. In contrast, the child born after the
father's death whose parents never attempted to marry must first
prove paternity. If the estate is still open after such a child has been
born and a court order of paternity entered, the child may then peti-
tion for a family allowance. No family allowance is available to the
posthumously conceived child, however, because the law does not give
her the means of establishing paternity.
The second source of postmortem support, an obligation fixed by
a divorce decree that survives the obligor's death, has limited applica-
tion for the child born after the father's death. This source of support
is available only to a child whose parents had been married, when
sexual intercourse and conception occurred in time for a support pro-
ment from the successor of the deceased parent to the extent provided in Division
8 (commencing with Section 13000) of the Probate Code.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3952 (West 1994).
72. Family Code § 7614(a) states: "A promise in writing to furnish support for a child,
growing out of a presumed or alleged father and child relationship, does not require con-
sideration and ... is enforceable according to its terms." CAL. FAM. CODE § 7614(a) (West
1994).
For purposes of this discussion, the terms must include an obligation of support that
survives the promisor's death.
73. Estate of Woodward, 40 Cal. Rptr. 781, 783 (Ct. App. 1964).
74. According to Black's Law Dictionary, the administration of a decedent's estate
usually involves: "(1) the collection of the decedent's assets; (2) payment of debts and
claims against the estate; (3) payment of estate taxes; [and] (4) distribution of the remain-
der of the estate among those entitled thereto." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 44 (6th ed.
1990). This process may take several months or, for large estates or estates involving com-
plicated issues such as a will contest or the sale of a business, even years.
75. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6542 (West 1991).
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vision for the unborn child to be included in the divorce decree, and
when the father then died prior to the child's birth-no doubt a rare
sequence of events. Obviously, no such source of support would be
available to the child conceived by coitus whose parents had never
attempted to marry, because without marriage there could be no di-
vorce decree. And, again, the posthumously conceived child is ex-
cluded at the outset because of the inability to prove the father-child
relationship.
Like the family allowance,. the "pauper's provision" applies to
any minor child for whom paternity can be established, providing it
appears that the child will be indigent.76 However, as with the re-
quirements for obtaining a family allowance, the claim made by the
county or state authorities must meet the filing deadlines imposed
under the Probate Code.77 When a child is in gestation at the time of
her father's death and it appears that after her birth the child will be
indigent or placed in a state institution, a claim likely could be made
within the time allowed. But the delay caused by the necessity of es-
tablishing paternity for a child whose parents never attempted to
marry may prevent the timely filing of a claim. Again, the posthu-
mously conceived child is excluded from the benefits of the "pauper's
provision" for lack of the means to establish the father-child
relationship.
Finally, the postmortem source of child support that may apply to
any child born after the father's death: a written promise to support a
child, growing out of a presumed or alleged father-child relationship,
which by its terms survives the promisor's death.78 At first blush, this
provision appears to offer a solution for the child for whom the other
support options are difficult or impossible to obtain. There is no need
to prove paternity, since the father-child relationship may be merely
"alleged"; since the promise was signed during the father's lifetime,
there are no deadlines or filing requirements to meet, making the
promise an enforceable obligation against the father's estate from the
moment of his death; and, in the case of a posthumously conceived
child, the father can simply include a condition that DNA testing con-
firm his paternity. However, two major problems arise under this
method. First, obtaining the father's signature on such a document
may be difficult. Some men are simply uninterested in providing for
children that result from an uncommitted relationship. 79 Second,
without complex restrictions, a blanket promise to support posthu-
76. See supra note 71.
77. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 9100 (West 1991), §§ 13109, 13204 (West 1991 & Supp.
1995).
78. See supra note 72.
79. "[T]he vast majority of unwed fathers have been unknown, unavailable, or simply
uninterested." Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
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mously conceived children could seriously disrupt the orderly distribu-
tion of a decedent's estate. One or more of such children could be
born many years after the decedent's death, and the estate would have
to be held open during that time until all possible beneficiaries could
be ascertained. It is unlikely that the state, given its strong interest in
the efficient administration of estates,80 would tolerate such a situa-
tion. Hence, a written promise to support a posthumously conceived
child, to be enforceable, likely would require the assistance of an at-
torney, a costly prospect that a man facing his death (e.g., in anticipa-
tion of joining a battlefield in wartime or suffering from a terminal
illness) may neglect to pursue. Of the four sources of support, an ef-
fective, enforceable written promise may be the most difficult to
procure.
In most cases, child support, other than a temporary family allow-
ance permitted when paternity is established and filing deadlines are
met, is not legally attainable for the child born after the father's death.
Instead, the child's mother must bear the entire burden of support.
Sometimes this burden is eased by a testamentary disposition in the
mother's favor, the benefits of a life insurance policy, or, if she is a
widow, an intestate share of the estate. But, in the absence of a legal
obligation that survives his death, the decision whether to provide for
a child born after a man's death is left to the man's discretion.81 While
this Note is concerned primarily with the welfare of the posthumously
conceived child, the curious state of the law raises the larger question
of why a parent's powers of testamentary disposition should not be
subordinated to the duty to care for a minor child that he has brought
into the world.82 In Estate of Smith, the court remarked, "The neces-
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 297, 306-07 n.23
(1990) (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 399 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
"The non-payment of child support by fathers provides another index of fathers' ap-
parent willingness and ability to detach from their children and their children's needs."
Shultz, supra at 307 n.23 (citations omitted).
80. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
81. The California Legislature has acknowledged the importance of child support and
has initiated a program for the voluntary establishment of paternity in part to make it
easier to ensure that a father meets his legal responsibility to care for his children. See
supra note 37 and accompanying text.
However, there remains the problem of support after a man's death. Hecht may have
anticipated this problem. Kane's children alleged that Hecht knew of Kane's desire to end
his life and that "Hecht convinced [Kane] to allow her to have his child after his death and
to leave her a substantial amount of his property to raise and care for this child." Hecht v.
Superior Court (Kane), 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 279 n.2 (Ct. App. 1993).
82. At least one commentator has advocated that the common-law doctrine holding
that a parent's support obligation terminates at death should be changed to conform to
"modern" thought, i.e., that the support obligation should survive the parent's death and
should be enforceable against the estate. See Gehrels, supra note 70, at 86 (footnote
omitted).
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
RIGHT TO BEQUEATH SPERM IN CALIFORNIA
sity for the support of the minor is the same, whether the father be
alive or dead .... Surely no obligation can exceed in importance that
which the father owes to his offspring."8
C. Child's Inheritance Rights
The California Legislature has the absolute power to control the
inheritance rights of its citizens, under both testamentary and intestate
schemes. 84 This plenary power includes the authority to determine
whom a testator may designate to receive the testator's property after
death.8 5 Whether inheritance statutes agree with notions of natural
right and justice is immaterial-the whole matter falls within legisla-
tive discretion.86 One of the legislature's primary goals in regulating
the transfer of property upon death is to promote the efficient settling
of a decedent's estate.87
(1) Posthumous Child's Rights Under Intestacy Law
If a person dies without a will, or if the will does not effectively
dispose of a portion of the estate, the estate or the affected portion
will be distributed to the decedent's heirs according to the law of in-
testate succession.88 The persons eligible to inherit property as a de-
cedent's heirs are determined by statute.8 9
The posthumously conceived child90 is excluded from heirship by
operation of Probate Code section 6407.91 This section permits a rela-
tive of the decedent who is born after the decedent's death to take by
intestate succession only if the relative was conceived before the dece-
dent's death. Thus, the date of death serves as a convenient cutoff
date.92
However, even if a child is conceived before her father's death
and born afterwards, she must still establish the parent-child relation-
ship in accordance with Probate Code section 6453 before she will be
83. Id. at 85 (citing Estate of Smith, 254 P. 567, 569 (Cal. 1927)).
84. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280 (citing Harkness v. Harkness, 23 Cal. Rptr. 175, 179
(Dist. Ct. App. 1962)).
85. Estate of Scott, 202 P.2d 357, 358-59 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1949).
86. See Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 280 (citing Harkness, 23 Cal. Rptr. at 179).
87. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
88. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6400-55 (West 1991 & Supp. 1995).
89. Id.
90. It is assumed that if the decedent died without a will, he conveyed his sperm pur-
suant to a contract with the sperm bank.
91. "Relatives of the decedent conceived before the decedent's death but born there-
after inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent." CAL. PROB. CODE
§6407 (West 1991)
92. The Hecht court acknowledged that, in view of this statute, it was unlikely that
Kane's estate would be subject to claims by his posthumous offspring. Hecht v. Superior
Court (Kane), 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 290 (Ct. App. 1993).
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considered an heir.93 If such a child was conceived by a couple who
were married or attempted to marry, she has the benefit of a presump-
tion of paternity, and thus qualifies as her father's intestate heir.
The requirements are more stringent under section 6453 for a
posthumous child conceived by a couple who never attempted to
marry.94 Such a child must file an action to establish paternity pursu-
ant to Family Code section 7630(c) 95 and must meet an additional re-
quirement imposed under the intestate succession statute: the court
order declaring paternity must be entered during the father's life-
time.96 When the child is born after the father's death, this require-
ment demands that a paternity action be filed and resolved within the
gestation period and prior to the father's death, thus imposing great
time pressure.97 The legislature has defended these restrictions as
necessary to discourage dubious paternity claims and to promote the
efficient settling of a decedent's estate.98
In light of the foregoing, it is likely that of children born after
their fathers' deaths, only the child conceived by coitus by a couple
who were married or attempted to marry will enjoy the right to re-
ceive a share of the father's estate by intestate succession.
(2) Wills and the Posthumous Child
In California, any person eighteen years or older who is of sound
mind may make a will.99 The testator's intent as expressed in the will
93. Section 6453 provides:
For the purpose of determining whether a person is a "natural parent" as that
term is used in this chapter:
(a) A natural parent and child relationship is established where that relation-
ship is presumed and not rebutted pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act, Part 3
(commencing with Section 7600) of Division 12 of the Family Code.
(b) A natural parent and child relationship may be established pursuant to
any other provisions of the Uniform Parentage Act, except that the relationship
may not be established by an action under subdivision (c) of Section 7630 of the
Family Code unless any of the following conditions exist:
(1) A court order was entered during the father's lifetime declaring paternity.
(2) Paternity is established by clear and convincing evidence that the father
has openly held out the child as his own.
(3) It was impossible for the father to hold out the child as his own and
paternity is established by clear and convincing evidence.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6453 (West Supp. 1995).
94. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
95. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7630(c) (West 1994).
96. See supra note 93. Obviously, the alternative requirement that clear and convinc-
ing evidence show that the father openly held out the child as his own cannot be met if the
child is born after the father's death.
97. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7633 (West 1994) (permitting a paternity action to be filed
prior to the child's birth).
98. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
99. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6100 (West 1991).
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controls the disposition of the testator's property,100 and statutory
rules of will construction apply only when the testator's intent is not
indicated or is ambiguous. 101 Thus, if a testator anticipates the birth
of a child after his death, whether conceived by coitus or posthu-
mously conceived, and the testator wishes to provide for that child,
specific provisions in favor of that child likely will be respected by the
probate court and discourage those who would be the alternate takers
from contesting the provision. 02
The need for specificity cannot be overemphasized with respect
to a bequest in favor of a child born after the father's death. A gen-
eral or ambiguous bequest will be interpreted using standard rules of
construction that tend to exclude both the posthumously conceived
child and the child born after the father's death who was conceived by
a couple that never attempted to marry. For example, if a father de-
vises property in a class gift'03 to "my children," a child who cannot
establish paternity will be excluded from the gift through the opera-
tion of a statute that provides that "persons born out of wedlock...
are included in terms of class gift or relationship in accordance with
the rules for determining relationship and inheritance rights for pur-
poses of intestate succession.' 0 4 Thus, if the requisite father-child re-
lationship cannot be established for purposes of intestate succession,
that child also is excluded from generally phrased gifts in a will. Nor-
mally, then, in the absence of a contrary intention, only the posthu-
mous child born to parents who were married or attempted to marry
will benefit under a class gift.
While there may be many more ramifications under the law of
trusts and estates for a child born after the father's death, the scope of
this Note permits mention of only'two that are of particular interest:
the rule against perpetuities and the pretermitted child statute.
If a father anticipates that a child may be born after his death,
either conceived in coitus or from his frozen sperm, and provides for
his future child, California's statutory rule against perpetuities holds
that the child's interest must vest or terminate within ninety years (i.e.,
the child must be born within ninety years of the father's death, or the
100. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21102 (West Supp. 1995).
101. Id.
102. See Laura D. Heard, A Time to Be Born, A Time to Die: Alternative Reproduction
and Texas Probate Law, 17 ST. MARY'S LJ. 927, 939 (1986).
103. Black's Law Dictionary defines a "class gift" as a gift "to a body of persons uncer-
tain in number at [the] time of [the] gift, to be ascertained at a future time." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 249 (6th ed. 1990). See CAL. PROB. CODE § 21113 (West Supp. 1995).
104. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21115 (West Supp. 1995).
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interest must terminate). 0 5 Obviously, if the child were conceived
through sexual intercourse, the child will be born within the perpetu-
ities period. But there is no such certainty with respect to the posthu-
mously conceived child: the father's sperm could remain frozen for
years, perhaps decades, before insemination is even attempted. In the
meantime, the administration of the father's estate or trust will be
hampered by waiting for a beneficiary who may never be born. One
can easily envision the frustration and resentment of relatives who
were already living at the man's death and whose expectation of an
inheritance has been postponed or thwarted entirely by his decision to
procreate after death.
If a father does not anticipate the birth of a child after his death
or if other circumstances, such as illness, prevent him from altering his
will to provide for a child born after the execution of the will and
there is no evidence that the omission was intentional, a pretermitted
child statute applies. The statute operates on the presumption that
the omission was unintentional and revokes the will to the extent nec-
essary to give the child the same share of the estate that the child
would have received had the testator died intestate. 0 6 Again, if a
child cannot take under intestate succession because she cannot estab-
lish paternity, the pretermitted child statute will be of no help; accord-
ingly, of children born after a father's death, only the child who enjoys
a presumption of paternity because she was conceived by coitus by
parents who were married or attempted to marry will be able to bene-
fit from this statute.
Thus, through a properly drawn will, a child born after her fa-
ther's death may be designated as a beneficiary, regardless of the time
of conception or the marital status of the parents. However, great
care must be taken to specifically provide by name for the child who
cannot establish paternity, and, if a future interest is created for the
posthumously conceived child, the bequest must be drafted to comply
with the rule against perpetuities. Unfortunately, given the time, en-
ergy, and cost that estate planning demands, it is likely that a man who
has deposited his sperm prior to debilitating treatment for a terminal
illness, or who faces other physical risk, will neglect to make or amend
his will. This situation places the posthumously conceived child at a
disadvantage: her inheritance rights depend on the affirmative act of
an ill or otherwise distracted man.
105. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21205 (West Supp. 1995). See Heard, supra note 102, at 941-
44 (discussing the problems that arise in states that follow the common-law rule against
perpetuities and its application to children conceived by alternative reproduction).
106. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6570-6571 (West 1991).
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II. Assigning Paternal Responsibility Based on Intent to
Procreate
Social policy mandates that some person or persons be assigned
the task of investing the enormous amounts of time, energy, and
money to rear each child brought into the world.107 Throughout most
of our history, prior to the advent of birth control, reproduction was
condoned only within the confines of the marital relationship; power-
ful social pressures, reinforced by law, religion, and family norms, de-
manded chastity from the unmarried.108 Hence, entering into
marriage signified an intent to engage in sexual intercourse and, there-
fore, to procreate. 09 Consequently, the decision to marry brought
with it society's assignment to the married couple of the moral and
legal responsibility for caring for the children born from their
union.1 10 For the husband, this assignment of responsibility took the
form of the legal presumption of paternity."'
Although scientific advances can now ascertain paternity with
very little room for doubt, the historical method of determining pater-
nity based on the social norm of marriage is deeply ingrained in our
legal system," 2 and legislatures are resistant to change. 113 In 1989 the
United States Supreme Court upheld a California statute that pre-
vented a biological father or child from challenging the presumption
of paternity accorded the mother's husband, stating that biology was
"irrelevant" to legal paternity.1 4 And, as discussed previously, the
legislature has severely curtailed the means whereby a child whose
parents never attempted to marry can establish paternity for purposes
of inheritance." 5
In light of the California Legislature's reluctance to embrace
DNA testing or other modern methods of establishing paternity, biol-
ogy should not be the primary consideration in identifying the legal
father of the posthumously conceived child; rather, the intent of the
man who deposits his sperm in a sperm bank should be the deciding
factor. In essence, an intent to procreate indirectly formed the histori-
cal, social basis for existing law, which assigns a presumption of pater-
nity based on marriage or an attempt to marry, and so it should for the
man who fathers a child after his death.
107. See Shultz, supra note 79, at 330.
108. Id. at 305.
109. See id.
110. See id.
111. Id. at 317.
112. Id. at 317-18.
113. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
114. See Shultz supra note 79, at 318 (citing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 119
(1989)).
115. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
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If a man chooses to exercise his property rights in his sperm and
bequeath it for purposes of procreation after his death, there can be
no doubt as to his intent to father a child." 6 Either a man's will or the
terms of his agreement with the sperm bank will indicate how his
sperm should be disposed of upon his death and for what purpose. In
the wake of the Hecht decision, 1 7 sperm banks probably will take
great care to document a man's wishes in this respect.
But choice brings with it moral responsibility" 8 for the conse-
quences. And, during one's lifetime, the choice to procreate imposes
a legal responsibility as well-that of rearing one's child.'1 9 If a man
elects to father a child after his death, he will not be able to serve in
several important parental roles, such as companion, teacher, and role
model; but he can still be a financial provider.
The California Legislature has declared that there is a compelling
state interest in ensuring that a child receives financial support from
the parents. 120 If the state can require that a divorced man with chil-
dren enter into an agreement of support that survives his death and
becomes an enforceable obligation against his estate, the state should
make the same demand of the man who consciously and purposefully
elects to procreate after his death.
While one can speculate that in most cases such a man would
bequeath a portion of his estate to the intended mother of his posthu-
mous child for the benefit of the child, there is no guarantee; one need
only revisit Hecht to see the problems that can arise. In court docu-
ments, Kane's children alleged that Hecht had "convinced [Kane] to
allow her to have his child after his death and to leave her a substan-
tial amount of his property to raise and care for this child.' 121
Although Kane left the bulk of his estate to Hecht, stating in his will
that his adult children "are financially secure and therefore [I] leave
116. It is unlikely that a man might desire to keep his sperm "on ice" in order to be-
queath it as a personal memento, for, "as one activist put it, 'men seldom bond to their
ejaculate."' See Shultz, supra note 79, at 312 n.44, cited in A. Kaminiski, Rocking the Cra-
dle, Rocking the Boat: Surrogate Motherhood Legislation in California 22 (May 19, 1988)
(unpublished master's thesis).
117. Hecht v. Superior Court (Kane), 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993).
118. See Shultz, supra note 79, at 303. There is the possibility that a man might take
advantage of new reproductive methods and "plan to procreate without intending to rear
the child." Id. at 315. Indeed, Kane's children asserted in court documents that during his
lifetime Kane had steadfastly refused to have a child with Hecht. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
277; Answer of Real Parties in Interest William Everett Kane, Jr., Katharine E. Kane, and
Robert L. Greene, Administrator CTA of the Estate of William E. Kane to Petition for
Writ of Mandate/Prohibition in the First Instance and/or Other Extraordinary Relief:
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 30 (filed Apr. 9, 1993) (copy
on file with author).
119. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 37.
121. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 279 n.2.
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them nothing other than [a parcel of land],"'122 the ensuing will contest
and tentative settlement agreements suggest that a good portion, if
not most, of the estate will be distributed to Kane's adult children, and
not to Hecht. 23 Had Kane's estate been subject to an enforceable
support obligation, the interests of other beneficiaries would have
been subordinated to the needs of Kane's potential future child or
children.
Under existing law, a man who intends to father a child after his
death is not required to provide support for that child,124 nor can that
child claim part of the estate as either an intestate heir'25 or pretermit-
ted child.126 It is likely that, historically, a man was excused under the
common law from his duty of support upon his early death because
the whim of fate decreed that he die and leave minor children surviv-
ing him-he did not have a choice in the matter. But, after Hecht, a
man can choose, and he should not make this choice lightly. New leg-
islation should be enacted to protect the posthumously conceived
child and ensure that a man who desires to procreate from his grave
meets his parental responsibility to the extent he is able.
Mi. Other States' Approaches
Louisiana, North Dakota, and Virginia have enacted legislation
specifically directed toward the special circumstances of children born
through assisted conception. These statutes affect the paternity or in-
heritance rights of the posthumously conceived child.
(1) Louisiana
Louisiana's statute provides:
To be capable of receiving by donation inter vivos, an unborn child
must be in utero at the time the donation is made. To be capable of
receiving by donation mortis causa, an unborn child must be in
utero at the time of the death of the testator. In either case, the
donation has effect only if the child is born alive.127
The Revision Commission explains that the substance of the
"source" statute (dated 1870) has not changed; rather, this new statute
merely "modernized the language" to reflect recent developments in
reproductive technology. The new statute makes it clear that neither
an unfertilized gamete nor a fertilized embryo may receive a gift or
122., Last Will and Testament of William Everett Kane at 2 (Sept. 27, 1991) (copy on
file with author).
123. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 277.
124. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
125. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
127. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1474 (West Supp. 1995).
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inherit unless it had been implanted in utero "prior to the time the
donation inter vivos is made or the testator dies.' 128 Thus, under this
statute, the posthumously conceived child is precluded from inheriting
from the father. Only the man's unfertilized, cryogenically preserved
sperm would be in existence at the time of his death; neither insemina-
tion nor implantation would yet have occurred.
The posthumously conceived child is also denied other benefits
because of Louisiana law. As Nancy Hart of New Orleans discovered,
Louisiana law provides that a man is a "natural father" only if he was
alive at the time of conception.129 Nancy's daughter Judith was con-
ceived and born after the death of Nancy's husband, Ed Hart, who
had deposited sperm with a fertility clinic prior to undergoing chemo-
therapy. Louisiana law would not allow Nancy to list Ed as the legal
father on Judith's birth certificate. Because Judith did not have a legal
father under the applicable state law, the U.S. Department of Heath
and Human Services denied Judith $700 per month in Social Security
survivor's benefits. 130
Nancy is suing the state of Louisiana and the federal government
on the grounds that the law is unconstitutional. Her lawyer said, "We
plan to show, using this set of facts, logic and reason, that the law is
outdated and must be put aside.' 13 ' It remains to be seen whether
Nancy will succeed.
(2) North Dakota
North Dakota's statute provides in pertinent part: "A person
who dies before a conception using his sperm or her egg is not a par-
ent of any resulting child born of the conception.' 1 32
This statute is based upon the Uniform Status of Children of As-
sisted Conception Act.133 The Committee comment explains the pur-
pose of the statute:
[The above-cited statute] is designed to provide finality for the
determination of parenthood of those whose genetic material is uti-
lized in the procreation process after their death. The death of the
person whose genetic material is ... used in conceiving an embryo
... would end the potential parenthood of the deceased....
... It is designed primarily to avoid the problems of intestate
succession which could arise if the posthumous use of a person's
128. Id. cmt.
129. Mark Curriden, No Benefits for "Miracle" Baby, 81 A.B.A. J., Mar. 1995, at 18.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04 (1991).
133. UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT, 9B U.L.A. § 4
(Supp. 1994) (adopted by North Dakota and Virginia).
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genetic material could lead to the deceased being termed a parent.
Of course, those who want to explicitly provide for such children in
their wills may do so.13
This statute offers a simplistic solution to a more complex prob-
lem. It seeks to avoid disturbing the fights of those already living at
the time of the gamete-provider's death and to ensure the unimpeded
settlement of the estate, without due regard for fairness to the result-
ing child. As ilustrated by the observation that the decedent can vol-
untarily provide for the child by will, the posthumously conceived
child's inheritance rights turn upon the affirmative act of the parent-
a parent who may be either too ill or too concerned with other mat-
ters to make or amend a will.
(3) Virginia
The relevant Virginia statutes provide:
§ 64.1-8.1. Afterborn heirs.-Relatives of the decedent con-
ceived before his death but born thereafter, and children resulting
from assisted conception born after decedent's death who are deter-
mined to be relatives of the decedent as provided in... (§ 20-156 et
seq.) ... shall inherit as if they had been born during the lifetime of
the decedent. 135
§ 20-158.... B. Death of Spouse.-Any child resulting from the
insemination of a wife's ovum using her husband's sperm, with his
consent, is the child of the husband and wife notwithstanding that,
during the ten-month period immediately preceding the birth, either
party died.
However, any person who dies before in utero implantation of
an embryo resulting from the union of his sperm or her ovum with
another gamete, whether or not the other gamete is that of the per-
son's spouse, is not the parent of any resulting child unless (i) im-
plantation occurs before notice of the death can reasonably be
communicated to the physician performing the procedure or (ii) the
person consents to be a parent in writing executed before the
implantation.' 3 6
§ 20-164. A child whose status as a child is declared or negated
by this chapter is the child only of his parent or parents as deter-
mined under this chapter... for all purposes including, but not
limited to, (i) intestate succession; (i) probate law exemptions, al-
lowances, or other protections for children in a parent's estate; and
(iii) determining eligibility of the child or its descendants to share in
a donative transfer from any person as an individual or as a member
of a class determined by reference to the relationship. However, a
child born more than ten months after the death of a parent shall not
134. Id. cmt.
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-8.1 (Michie Supp. 1994).
136. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (Michie Supp. 1994).
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be recognized as such parent's child for the purposes of subdivisions
(i), (ii) and (iii) of this section.137
When a child is posthumously conceived from sperm bequeathed
or contractually conveyed at the father's death, these statutes con-
strued together deny the child inheritance rights under intestate suc-
cession, protective rights in the father's probate proceeding, and
beneficiary status for donative transfers made with reference to the
father-child relationship unless the child is born within ten months af-
ter the father's death. These rights and benefits also will be denied if
the parents were not married and the insemination method is used,
even if the child is born within the ten-month period. For unmarried
couples, then, it would appear more advantageous to use the implan-
tation method with a written consent to be a parent; however, the
birth still must occur within the ten-month period.
The rigid deadline of these statutes seems harsh. While techni-
cally possible to meet, a woman to whom a man has bequeathed or
contractually conveyed his sperm may be too consumed with grief
over the loss of her mate or preoccupied with handling his affairs to
immediately seek insemination. Even if she attempts insemination
promptly after the man's death, she may be unable to conceive right
away. Moreover, the deadline may encourage some women to induce
early labor so that the birth will occur in time and the child will re-
ceive the rights and benefits attendant to the father-child relationship.
(4) Analysis
The Louisiana, North Dakota, and Virginia Legislatures have
failed to respond to the unique circumstances of the posthumously
conceived child. Even though drafted to take into account new repro-
ductive methods, these statutes adhere to rules of paternity and prop-
erty devolution that are based on an obsolete notion of procreation.
In Louisiana and North Dakota, the date of death still serves as the
cutoff date by which conception must have occurred in order for the
resulting child to claim rights and benefits accruing from the parent-
child relationship. Although Virginia does not mandate that concep-
tion must take place prior to the gamete-provider's death, the period
within which the birth must occur achieves the same effect: it is the
same period in which birth normally occurs following conception by
sexual intercourse.
Rather than forcing the posthumously conceived child to conform
to an outdated legislative scheme, the law should acknowledge a dece-
dent's new, expanded "window of fertility" and respond in kind.
137. VA. CODE AN. § 20-164 (Michie Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
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IV. Amending California Law
The California Legislature has the power to restrict the rights of
its citizens to dispose of their property upon death.138 In view of the
unique reproductive attributes of sperm, the state could justify placing
reasonable conditions on a man's exercise of his property rights in
semen at his death in order to protect the resulting child. The legisla-
ture's concern about dubious paternity claims and its interest in pro-
moting the efficient settling of a decedent's estate139 can be
accommodated without impacting the existing legislative scheme be-
yond tolerable limits. The following proposals could help to achieve
these goals.
A. Preliminary Considerations
In keeping with an individual's reproductive freedoms protected
by the United States Constitution,1 40 a husband's property interest in
his frozen sperm should be characterized as his separate property.
Accordingly, Family Code section 770141 should be amended to ex-
pressly provide that the separate property of a married person in-
cludes his or her cryogenically preserved genetic material. The
progenitor's spouse should be precluded from acquiring an interest in
the progenitor's gametes in the event of the dissolution of the mar-
riage or the death of the progenitor, unless the progenitor specifically
directs otherwise in the sperm or ova bank agreement.
In addition, the persons who may qualify as the recipient of the
sperm should be restricted. These restrictions should not mandate a
marital relationship, however. As the Hecht court noted, it is not
against California public policy to inseminate an unmarried woman.1 42
Rather, these restrictions should focus upon the prohibition of "inces-
tuous procreation," when the man and the woman are related by
blood,143 and "stranger procreation," when a man simply designates a
"willing woman," or uses an equally indefinite description. Some min-
imum level of relationship and commitment during the couple's life-
time should be required on public policy grounds.144 Upon the
138. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
140. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992) (recognizing that
the law "affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, pro-
creation, conception, [and] family relationships").
141. CAL. FAm. CoDE § 770 (West 1994).
142. Hecht v. Superior Court (Kane), 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 286 (Ct. App. 1993).
143. See Djalleta, supra note 29, at 363-64 (arguing that "an individual should not be
able to leave gametes ... to his or her sibling, parent, or child").
144. A minimum standard of commitment is already used by physicians who have been
requested to harvest sperm from the bodies of dead men. In the two cases described in the
Gallagher and Stryker articles, supra note 22, the couples were married. In one case, the
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designated woman's death or waiver, the deposited sperm should be
destroyed by the sperm bank; the designee should not have the right
to bequeath or contractually convey the sperm further.
B. Establishing Contingent Paternity and Obligation of Support by
Voluntary Declaration
Two statutes currently in existence can be adapted to enable a
man who desires to father a child after his death to establish his pater-
nity and subject his estate to a support obligation: Family Code sec-
tions 7570-7577, providing a means of voluntary declaration of
paternity, 145 and Family Code section 7614, relating to the written
promise to support a child growing out of a presumed or alleged fa-
ther-child relationship. 146 In conjunction with adaptations made to
these statutes, an exception should be created under Family Code sec-
tion 7613(b) to allow the man to be treated in law as the natural father
of the posthumously conceived child.
At the time a man contacts a sperm bank and indicates that upon
his death his sperm should be made available to a designated person
for the purpose of procreation, the sperm bank should inform him
that it is prohibited by law from accepting his sperm deposit unless he
signs a document relating to paternity and support, with his signature
acknowledged by a notary public. With respect to paternity, the docu-
ment should provide that the person signing intends to father a child
after his death and accepts paternity for that child, and that his volun-
tary acceptance of paternity is contingent upon both a physician's
written verification that his sperm was used to conceive the child147
and, after the child is born, confirmation through DNA testing that
the child is his biological offspring. 48 The document should also in-
clude a notice provision similar to that incorporated in the voluntary
infertility specialist stated that he would not have performed the procedure for an "unsta-
ble relationship." Stryker, supra note 22. The other doctor "refused to harvest sperm from
a dead man for a woman who was 'merely' the common-law wife of the deceased." l
145. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 7570-7577 (West 1994).
146. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7614 (West 1994).
147. See Shapiro & Sonnenblick, supra note 22, at 245 n.124 (citing Winthrop Thies, A
Look to the Future: Property Rights and the Posthumously Conceived Child, 110 TR. &
EsT. 992, 923 (1971)). Thies suggested that both the woman and the physician should exe-
cute an affidavit after each artificial insemination, attesting that the procedure was con-
ducted with the decedent's sperm.
148. A few samples of the decedent's sperm should be retained by the sperm bank for
purposes of DNA testing after the child's birth.
The requirements of the certificate and the DNA testing are meant to assure the man
that the child he will posthumously support is his own, and not to serve as the basis of
establishing his paternity; rather, his voluntary statement of intent in the contract with the
sperm bank should suffice to award him a presumption of paternity.
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declaration of paternity 49 advising the man of the legal consequences
of the document, particularly the implications of his support obliga-
tion and its affect upon his testamentary rights.
With respect to the support obligation, the document should pro-
vide that the man agrees that the testamentary disposition of his prop-
erty is subject to an obligation to support his posthumously conceived
child, and that this obligation overrides all purported transfers of
property at death, including those passing by contract, such as life in-
surance policies, or by operation of law, such as joint tenancy prop-
erty. There should also be a recapture provision so that property may
be retrieved from transferees when it was conveyed prior to the fa-
ther's death with the intent to avoid his support obligation.150 An ex-
ception would make unnecessary any setting aside of estate property
for child support when all or the bulk of the decedent's property
passes to the woman who is designated as the recipient of the sperm.
If there is more than enough property in the estate to support the
posthumously conceived child, the portion in excess of that amount
will pass under the normal laws of testamentary disposition or intes-
tate succession. A written promise containing these provisions should
fulfill the requirements of Family Code section 7614151 and thus be
enforceable against the man's estate.
C. Efficiency and Estate Issues
To accommodate the need for the efficient settling of a dece-
dent's estate, a limitation should be placed on the time period during
which a child can be posthumously conceived and still be entitled to
receive benefits from the father's estate. For this purpose, legislation
should be passed to keep open a decedent's "window of fertility" until
the first to occur of: two years after the date of his death; the death or
(re)marriage of the woman to whom he bequeathed or contractually
conveyed his sperm; and the woman's written, notarized statement,
filed with a court, that she does not intend to attempt to conceive a
child, or any additional children, using the decedent's sperm.152 An
149. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7574 (West 1994).
150. There is precedent for such a recapture provision in California law. When a per-
son transfers quasi-community property to a person other than the surviving spouse for
less than fair consideration, thereby defeating the surviving spouse's expectancy in the
property, one-half of the property may be restored to the decedent's estate. CAL. PRoB.
CODE § 102 (West 1991).
151. See supra note 72.
152. The maximum number of years by which a decedent's "window of fertility" may
be kept open should not be left to the decedent's discretion. Otherwise, his estate could
remain unsettled for many years, burdening the court system and causing frustration and
resentment among family members who were already living at his death. Therefore, to the
extent that a testator purports to provide for a child who is conceived beyond the statutory
"window," his will should be ineffective.
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extension of the two-year "window" may be granted for periods when
the woman's access to the sperm was impeded by litigation, or on ac-
count of extended illness, injury, or other hardship. During the statu-
tory "window of fertility," the estate will be managed by the personal
representative and family allowance payments may be made to eligi-
ble persons. Preliminary distributions should be permitted with cau-
tion, however, because there should be sufficient assets left in the
estate to allow for the possibility of multiple posthumously conceived
children. To ensure that no problem will arise under the rule against
perpetuities (e.g., when an interest has been held in trust for several
decades and a descendant's "window of fertility" threatens to violate
the rule), the statutory "window of fertility" provision should be made
expressly subordinate to the perpetuities law;153 if the nonvesting of a
particular interest may violate the perpetuities provision because of
the expanded fertility period, then the interest must vest in the next
successor as though the fertility period had ended without the concep-
tion of the beneficiary.
If a child is conceived during the expanded "window of fertility,"
that child will be accorded all rights of inheritance enjoyed by a child
conceived during the father's lifetime. 154 If the father left a will that
does not specifically mention the child, she will be treated as a
pretermitted child; or, if the father died intestate, she will take a share
of the estate as an intestate heir. Although the father may intention-
ally elect not to provide for the posthumously conceived child in his
will,1 5 5 the support obligation will guarantee that the child receives a
share of the estate.156
With respect to donative transfers made by others, the posthu-
mously conceived child will be eligible to share either as an individual
or as a member of a class determined by reference to the father-child
relationship. If the transfer is testamentary and becomes effective
during the father's statutory "window of fertility," the transferor's es-
tate necessarily must be kept open until it is determined whether con-
ception will occur. Of course, a transferor may avoid this result
simply by including a clause in the will which excludes such posthu-
mously conceived persons.
Upon the close of the decedent's "window of fertility," the estate
will be distributed. The recipient of the sperm may continue to at-
tempt to conceive children using the decedent's semen; however, any
153. CAL. PROB. CODE § 21205 (West Supp. 1995).
154. Although conception must occur during the two-year "window," the actual birth
may occur after this period has expired. If conception occurs, the child's share of the estate
will not vest unless the child is born alive and meets any survival requirements.
155. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6570-71 (West 1991).
156. See supra notes 145-151 and accompanying text.
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child thereafter conceived will not be entitled to any support or inheri-
tance from the father's estate.
Given the rare cases in which this issue is likely to arise, a two-
year delay should not unduly burden the probate court. Nor should
the postponement of distribution cause substantial hardship to the
persons interested in the decedent's estate. In fact, in court docu-
ments filed by Kane's children, they proposed keeping their father's
estate open for a two-year period from the date of an order directing
distribution of the sperm to allow for children to be conceived and
born.157
Conclusion
Legislation consistent with the guidelines described above will
give the posthumously conceived child the opportunity to enjoy the
same rights as other children, tempered by the need for the orderly
distribution of a decedent's estate. Although Hecht established that a
man has a property interest in and the power of disposition over his
sperm, the California Legislature has the authority to restrict that
right to further its compelling state interest in the well-being of chil-
dren. A man's decision to father a child after his death should be
entered into seriously and with the utmost concern for the child. If
the recommendations made in this Note are followed, there should be
no qualms about dubious claims of paternity and no substantial im-
pediment to the efficient settling of the decedent's affairs. Regretta-
bly, the posthumously conceived child will be deprived of the
companionship of her biological father; surely there is no need for her
to suffer from the lack of his financial support, as well. It is time for
the law to reflect the new reproductive technology.
157. Hecht v. Superior Court (Kane), 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993); Opposition
of Real Parties in Interest William Everett Kane, Jr., Katharine E. Kane, and Robert L.
Greene, Administrator CTA of the Estate of William E. Kane to Petition for Writ of Man-
date/Prohibition in the First Instance and/or Other Extraordinary Relief at 30 (filed Mar.
13, 1993) (copy on file with author).
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